put on, but some one must produce another which is clean and new. Now I
shall disregard this move of yours, and shall ask over again,--Where did
you learn and how do you know the nature of the expedient, and who is your
teacher? All this I comprehend in a single question, and now you will
manifestly be in the old difficulty, and will not be able to show that you
know the expedient, either because you learned or because you discovered it
yourself. But, as I perceive that you are dainty, and dislike the taste of
a stale argument, I will enquire no further into your knowledge of what is
expedient or what is not expedient for the Athenian people, and simply
request you to say why you do not explain whether justice and expediency
are the same or different? And if you like you may examine me as I have
examined you, or, if you would rather, you may carry on the discussion by
yourself.

ALCIBIADES: But I am not certain, Socrates, whether I shall be able to
discuss the matter with you.

SOCRATES: Then imagine, my dear fellow, that I am the demus and the
ecclesia; for in the ecclesia, too, you will have to persuade men
individually.

ALCIBIADES: Yes.

SOCRATES: And is not the same person able to persuade one individual
singly and many individuals of the things which he knows? The grammarian,
for example, can persuade one and he can persuade many about letters.

ALCIBIADES: True.

SOCRATES: And about number, will not the same person persuade one and
persuade many?

ALCIBIADES: Yes.

SOCRATES: And this will be he who knows number, or the arithmetician?

ALCIBIADES: Quite true.

SOCRATES: And cannot you persuade one man about that of which you can
persuade many?

ALCIBIADES: I suppose so.

SOCRATES: And that of which you can persuade either is clearly what you
know?

ALCIBIADES: Yes.

SOCRATES: And the only difference between one who argues as we are doing,
and the orator who is addressing an assembly, is that the one seeks to
persuade a number, and the other an individual, of the same things.

ALCIBIADES: I suppose so.

SOCRATES: Well, then, since the same person who can persuade a multitude
can persuade individuals, try conclusions upon me, and prove to me that the
just is not always expedient.

ALCIBIADES: You take liberties, Socrates.

SOCRATES: I shall take the liberty of proving to you the opposite of that
which you will not prove to me.

ALCIBIADES: Proceed.

SOCRATES: Answer my questions--that is all.

ALCIBIADES: Nay, I should like you to be the speaker.

SOCRATES: What, do you not wish to be persuaded?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly I do.

SOCRATES: And can you be persuaded better than out of your own mouth?

ALCIBIADES: I think not.

SOCRATES: Then you shall answer; and if you do not hear the words, that
the just is the expedient, coming from your own lips, never believe another
man again.

ALCIBIADES: I won't; but answer I will, for I do not see how I can come to
any harm.

SOCRATES: A true prophecy! Let me begin then by enquiring of you whether
you allow that the just is sometimes expedient and sometimes not?

ALCIBIADES: Yes.

SOCRATES: And sometimes honourable and sometimes not?

ALCIBIADES: What do you mean?

SOCRATES: I am asking if you ever knew any one who did what was
dishonourable and yet just?

ALCIBIADES: Never.

SOCRATES: All just things are honourable?



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