virtue the same in a child and in a slave, Meno? Can the child govern his
father, or the slave his master; and would he who governed be any longer a
slave?

MENO: I think not, Socrates.

SOCRATES: No, indeed; there would be small reason in that. Yet once more,
fair friend; according to you, virtue is 'the power of governing;' but do
you not add 'justly and not unjustly'?

MENO: Yes, Socrates; I agree there; for justice is virtue.

SOCRATES: Would you say 'virtue,' Meno, or 'a virtue'?

MENO: What do you mean?

SOCRATES: I mean as I might say about anything; that a round, for example,
is 'a figure' and not simply 'figure,' and I should adopt this mode of
speaking, because there are other figures.

MENO: Quite right; and that is just what I am saying about virtue--that
there are other virtues as well as justice.

SOCRATES: What are they? tell me the names of them, as I would tell you
the names of the other figures if you asked me.

MENO: Courage and temperance and wisdom and magnanimity are virtues; and
there are many others.

SOCRATES: Yes, Meno; and again we are in the same case: in searching
after one virtue we have found many, though not in the same way as before;
but we have been unable to find the common virtue which runs through them
all.

MENO: Why, Socrates, even now I am not able to follow you in the attempt
to get at one common notion of virtue as of other things.

SOCRATES: No wonder; but I will try to get nearer if I can, for you know
that all things have a common notion. Suppose now that some one asked you
the question which I asked before: Meno, he would say, what is figure?
And if you answered 'roundness,' he would reply to you, in my way of
speaking, by asking whether you would say that roundness is 'figure' or 'a
figure;' and you would answer 'a figure.'

MENO: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And for this reason--that there are other figures?

MENO: Yes.

SOCRATES: And if he proceeded to ask, What other figures are there? you
would have told him.

MENO: I should.

SOCRATES: And if he similarly asked what colour is, and you answered
whiteness, and the questioner rejoined, Would you say that whiteness is
colour or a colour? you would reply, A colour, because there are other
colours as well.

MENO: I should.

SOCRATES: And if he had said, Tell me what they are?--you would have told
him of other colours which are colours just as much as whiteness.

MENO: Yes.

SOCRATES: And suppose that he were to pursue the matter in my way, he
would say: Ever and anon we are landed in particulars, but this is not
what I want; tell me then, since you call them by a common name, and say
that they are all figures, even when opposed to one another, what is that
common nature which you designate as figure--which contains straight as
well as round, and is no more one than the other--that would be your mode
of speaking?

MENO: Yes.

SOCRATES: And in speaking thus, you do not mean to say that the round is
round any more than straight, or the straight any more straight than round?

MENO: Certainly not.

SOCRATES: You only assert that the round figure is not more a figure than
the straight, or the straight than the round?

MENO: Very true.

SOCRATES: To what then do we give the name of figure? Try and answer.
Suppose that when a person asked you this question either about figure or
colour, you were to reply, Man, I do not understand what you want, or know
what you are saying; he would look rather astonished and say: Do you not
understand that I am looking for the 'simile in multis'? And then he might
put the question in another form: Meno, he might say, what is that 'simile
in multis' which you call figure, and which includes not only round and
straight figures, but all? Could you not answer that question, Meno? I
wish that you would try; the attempt will be good practice with a view to
the answer about virtue.

MENO: I would rather that you should answer, Socrates.



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