SOCRATES: Shall I indulge you?
MENO: By all means.
SOCRATES: And then you will tell me about virtue?
MENO: I will.
SOCRATES: Then I must do my best, for there is a prize to be won.
MENO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Well, I will try and explain to you what figure is. What do you
say to this answer?--Figure is the only thing which always follows colour.
Will you be satisfied with it, as I am sure that I should be, if you would
let me have a similar definition of virtue?
MENO: But, Socrates, it is such a simple answer.
SOCRATES: Why simple?
MENO: Because, according to you, figure is that which always follows
colour.
(SOCRATES: Granted.)
MENO: But if a person were to say that he does not know what colour is,
any more than what figure is--what sort of answer would you have given him?
SOCRATES: I should have told him the truth. And if he were a philosopher
of the eristic and antagonistic sort, I should say to him: You have my
answer, and if I am wrong, your business is to take up the argument and
refute me. But if we were friends, and were talking as you and I are now,
I should reply in a milder strain and more in the dialectician's vein; that
is to say, I should not only speak the truth, but I should make use of
premisses which the person interrogated would be willing to admit. And
this is the way in which I shall endeavour to approach you. You will
acknowledge, will you not, that there is such a thing as an end, or
termination, or extremity?--all which words I use in the same sense,
although I am aware that Prodicus might draw distinctions about them: but
still you, I am sure, would speak of a thing as ended or terminated--that
is all which I am saying--not anything very difficult.
MENO: Yes, I should; and I believe that I understand your meaning.
SOCRATES: And you would speak of a surface and also of a solid, as for
example in geometry.
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Well then, you are now in a condition to understand my
definition of figure. I define figure to be that in which the solid ends;
or, more concisely, the limit of solid.
MENO: And now, Socrates, what is colour?
SOCRATES: You are outrageous, Meno, in thus plaguing a poor old man to
give you an answer, when you will not take the trouble of remembering what
is Gorgias' definition of virtue.
MENO: When you have told me what I ask, I will tell you, Socrates.
SOCRATES: A man who was blindfolded has only to hear you talking, and he
would know that you are a fair creature and have still many lovers.
MENO: Why do you think so?
SOCRATES: Why, because you always speak in imperatives: like all beauties
when they are in their prime, you are tyrannical; and also, as I suspect,
you have found out that I have weakness for the fair, and therefore to
humour you I must answer.
MENO: Please do.
SOCRATES: Would you like me to answer you after the manner of Gorgias,
which is familiar to you?
MENO: I should like nothing better.
SOCRATES: Do not he and you and Empedocles say that there are certain
effluences of existence?
MENO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And passages into which and through which the effluences pass?
MENO: Exactly.
SOCRATES: And some of the effluences fit into the passages, and some of
them are too small or too large?
MENO: True.
SOCRATES: And there is such a thing as sight?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And now, as Pindar says, 'read my meaning:'--colour is an
effluence of form, commensurate with sight, and palpable to sense.
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